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Compliance Problems in WTO
Dispute Settlement
William J. Davey t
This Comment surveys the problems of compliance facing the World
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system and considers
reforms that might improve compliance. In general, the WTO dispute set-
tlement system has an excellent compliance record. A recent examination
of the implementation record of WTO decisions for the first ten years of
WTO dispute settlement found a compliance rate of 83%.1 Although new
problem cases continue to arise, several of the ten problem cases outstand-
ing at the time of the study have since been resolved. 2 This compliance
rate is very good for an international state-to-state dispute settlement sys-
tem. 3 Moreover, the success rate of consultations in WTO cases that do
not result in either adopted panel or Appellate Body reports is impressive.
4
The picture, however, is not so rosy if one looks beyond general statis-
tics and considers the quality and timeliness of compliance actions. By
"quality of compliance actions," I am referring to how a WTO decision was
implemented and whether the offending measure was withdrawn. If the
offending measure was withdrawn, then there probably was not a problem
with the quality of the compliance action. Alternatively, if the offending
measure was modified or replaced, the compliance action may not have
been truly satisfactory. When I refer to the "timeliness of compliance," I
am asking whether the implementing action was taken within the reasona-
ble period of time set for implementation. Timeliness also encompasses
inquiries into whether the time taken by the panel and appellate processes
t Guy Raymond Jones Chair in Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17, 46-48 (2005) [hereinafter The First Ten Years].
2. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
284 (5th ed. 2008).
3. Even though the WTO system has faced more challenging cases, the success rate
is comparable to the success rate of the GATT dispute settlement system. The First Ten
Years, supra note 1, at 48; see ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 344-51 (1991). The success rate in
the WTO system is clearly better than the success rate in the International Court of
Justice. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An
Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229,
1308-12 (2004) (finding a 68% compliance rate, as defined by the authors, for a sample
of cases before the International Court of Justice).
4. William J. Davey, Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results Have Been
Achieved Through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports?, in THE WTO IN THE
TWENTY-FiRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA 98,
102-07 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Evaluating WTO Dispute
Settlement].
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has met the standards specified in the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU).5
An examination of the quality and timeliness of compliance in the first
ten years of the WTO dispute settlement system reveals some interesting
patterns. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) cases typically
result in the timely withdrawal of the contested measure.6 The two TRIPS
cases brought against the United States 7 and the European Communities -
Bananas8 case are the main exceptions to this trend. 9 In other words, the
desired result has generally been achieved in GATT and TRIPS cases.
There have also typically been timely withdrawals of the contested mea-
sures in safeguard and textiles cases; however, the contested measures in
these cases were often in place for all or most of the initially intended
period of effectiveness. 10 Thus, compliance was timely in terms of respect-
ing the reasonable period of time for implementation set by the WTO dis-
pute settlement process, but the overall WTO process took so long that
implementation was not very meaningful in practical terms. 1 In 75% of
trade remedy cases, the typical result has been a modification of the mea-
sure, which does not result in a significant change in the applied duty 50%
of the time.12 Trade remedy cases often take a long time, and almost one-
half of the Article 21.5 compliance proceedings have involved trade remedy
cases. 13 Modifications and compliance disputes have also been common
in agriculture, subsidy, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) cases. 14
Thus, in these cases-particularly in trade remedy cases-compliance is
often not timely and may not have much practical effect.
5. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes arts. 12, 16.4, 17.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
6. Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 114-15, 139-40.
7. Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter US-Section 211 Appropriations Act];
Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June
15, 2000) (adopted July 27, 2000) [hereinafter US-Section 110(5) Copyright Act].
8. Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
9. Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 115, 140. The two cases in
which the United States has been found to have violated the TRIPS Agreement required
Congressional action for implementation, which has not been forthcoming. Id. at 115.
The prevailing party in the two cases, the European Union, has never sought authority to
retaliate, perhaps because the cases involve a relatively limited amount of trade.
10. Id. at 110.
11. Id. at 113-14.
12. William J. Davey, Implementation of the Results of WTO Remedy Cases, in THE
WTO TRADE REMEDY SYsTEM: EAST AsiAN PERSPEcTIVES 33, 33-61 (Mitsuo Matsushita et
al. eds., 2006).
13. Dispute Settlement Body, Annual Report (2007), Addendum, Overview of the State
of Play of WTO Disputes, 92-95, WT/DSB/43/Add.1 (Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter DSB
Annual Report (2007)].
14. Id.; Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 114-15, 139-40.
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Overall, timely compliance occurred in about 60% of the cases.' 5
Trade remedies, subsidies, agriculture, and SPS cases were problem
areas. 16 Countries that failed to comply in a timely manner in the first
decade of WTO dispute settlement included the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, Canada, Japan, and Australia. 17 These countries often failed
to comply in cases against each other. 18 Accordingly, their on-time imple-
mentation rate was 50%.19 Developing countries achieved a higher on-
time implementation rate of over 80%.20 Trends observed during the first
decade have continued during succeeding years, although trade remedy
cases now predominate in contested dispute settlement proceedings, 2 ' and
the United States has become the main source of untimely implementation
of WTO decisions.22
Finally, with respect to the overall timeliness of the panel and appel-
late process, a detailed examination of the time taken by panels to issue
their reports shows that panels typically exceed the targets set in the DSU
by many months, especially in Article 21.5 compliance proceedings. 2 3
While the Appellate Body usually issues its report within ninety days of an
appeal, 24 the overall time taken by the process-especially when the "rea-
15. Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 137-38 (discussing country-
by-country implementation as of December 2004).
16. Id. at 114.
17. Id. at 113, 138.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2007, 42-47, WT/AB/9 (Jan. 30, 2008)
[hereinafter Appellate Body 2007 Annual Report].
22. The United States has reported to the Dispute Settlement Body monthly for
many years on its failure to implement in three cases. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body,
Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on March 14, 2008, 11 1-50, WT/
DSB/M/248 (Apr. 30, 2008) (discussing Appellate Body Report, United States- Contin-
ued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan.
16, 2003) (adopted Jan. 27, 2003) [hereinafter United States- Continued Dumping]; US-
Section 211 Appropriations Act, supra note 7; US- Section 110(5) Copyright Act, supra note
7). Moreover, there is one case in which the European Union and Japan comment
monthly on the failure of the United States to implement or report. Id. C11 20-45 (dis-
cussing United States- Continued Dumping, supra). In addition, the United States has
recently lost three Article 21.5 compliance actions. See generally Appellate Body Report,
United States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil,
WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008); Panel Report, United States-Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS294/RW (Dec. 17, 2008); Panel Report,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Ser-
vices, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/RW (Mar.
30, 2007) [hereinafter US-Gambling]. Another compliance action is pending against
the United States as well. See WTO Secretariat, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases,
77-78, WT/DS/OV/33 (June 3, 2008) (discussing how Japan requested the creation of
an Article 21.5 panel to resolve compliance issues of United States-Zeroing (Japan)).
23. William J. Davey, Expediting the Panel Process in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE
WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 409, 415-18,
420-21 (Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson & Alan Yanovich eds., 2008) [Expediting
the Panel Process].
24. Id. at 418.
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sonable" periods of time for implementation are taken into account-is
quite long.25 This Comment will not further consider the problem of the
length of proceedings, except to note that reforms are both needed and
feasible. 26
Taken together, the foregoing suggests that although the WTO dispute
settlement system may have an admirable record overall, considerable room
for improving the quality and timeliness of compliance exists. Indeed,
businesses have expressed concerns about non-compliance and delays as
reasons not to use the WTO dispute settlement system, which raises seri-
ous concerns for the future. 27 Thus, it is appropriate to consider the ques-
tion of what changes might be made to the system to address these
problems. Accordingly, I will briefly consider changes in compensation
and retaliation rules.
First, although compensation by definition does not produce compli-
ance, it is worth examining because it compensates for non-compliance.
Currently, the DSU provides for the possibility of negotiating compensa-
tion in lieu of retaliation within the twenty-day period following the expira-
tion of the reasonable period of time. 28 Though parties seldom use
compensation, there are several cases in which the parties agreed to com-
pensation.29 This raises two questions: (1) whether it would be desirable
to promote more use of compensation and (2) how such greater use could
be facilitated in practical terms.
I think that it would be beneficial to expand the use of compensation.
It could be particularly desirable for developing countries if they find
themselves in a situation where timely implementation is not going to
occur and retaliatory action is not practical, as is typically the case.
Although I acknowledge concerns that this is tantamount to allowing coun-
25. Id. at 419-20.
26. Id. at 421-30.
27. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Poultry Producers Do Not Plan to Urge U.S. to File
Case at WTO over EU Import Ban, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), June 9, 2008 (noting EU
failure to comply in the Hormones case). In the DSU reform negotiations, Mexico has
been particularly critical of what it calls the "'fundamental problem' of the WTO dispute
settlement system, namely the 'period of time which a WTO-inconsistent measure can be
in place without the slightest consequences' to the offending party." Daniel Pruzin, Mex-
ico Presents 'Radical' Proposal for WTO Dispute Resolution Reform, 19 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1984, 1984 (2002).
28. DSU art. 22.1-22.2.
29. Generally, compensation has been used when certain implementing measures
have been delayed beyond the end of the reasonable period of time set for implementa-
tion. See, e.g., Mutually Acceptable Solution on Modalities for Implementation, Japan-
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/20, WT/DS10/20, WT/DS11/18 (Jan. 12, 1998)
(Japan provided trade compensation to Canada); Notification of Mutually Acceptable
Solution, Turkey- Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/14
(july 19, 2001) (Turkey provided trade compensation to India); Agreement Under Arti-
cle 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circu-
lar Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/18 (July 31, 2002) (the
United States provided trade compensation to Korea); Notification of a Mutually Satis-
factory Temporary Arrangement, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/23 (June 26, 2003) (the United States provided monetary compensation for
three years of non-implementation).
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tries-particularly rich countries-to buy their way out of obligations, I
think that, on balance, promoting this option-which would not be a
requirement-would be useful.30
The more difficult question is how the use of compensation could be
facilitated. The most promising suggestion involves establishing a proce-
dure to set the level of nullification or impairment earlier than it is pres-
ently set.31 This procedure would facilitate the use of compensation
because the procedure would establish a more clear basis for conducting
compensation negotiations and there would be a concrete starting point-
and perhaps ending point-for negotiating the amount owed. The offend-
ing party, however, would still have to agree to provide compensation.
Although ideas positing ways that compensation might be "compelled"
exist,32 these ideas are difficult to implement as long as the respondent is
recalcitrant.
An alternative solution contemplates improving compliance by
increasing the effectiveness of the WTO's ultimate weapon-retaliation-or
through other remedies. 33 It is worth noting that the overall effectiveness
of retaliation may be somewhat questionable. The third edition of the clas-
sic Hufbauer study on the effectiveness of economic sanctions finds that
economic sanctions work only about one-third of the time, although the
study does not look at economic sanctions taken for GATT/WTO-related
30. It is worth mentioning that although there are some notable exceptions, most
long-term non-compliance has occurred in disputes between developed countries. See,
e.g., Request to Join Consultations, Communication from Cameroon, European Commu-
nities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/74 (Dec.
11, 2006) (dispute arising between Cameroon and European Communities); US- Gam-
bling, supra note 22 (dispute involving Antigua and Barbuda). However, poorer and
smaller developing countries might make greater use of the WTO dispute settlement
system if it seemed more probable that a useful result could be achieved. See William J.
Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How Have Developing Countries Fared?
24-40 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-17,
2005) [hereinafter How Have Developing Countries Fared?], available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=862804 (analyzing the use of dispute resolution by small and large developing
countries). So far, only large developing countries are significant users of the system.
Id.
31. Korea has proposed that Article 21.5 compliance panels set the level of nullifica-
tion or impairment in cases where they find non-implementation. See Special Session of
Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the Republic of Korea to the Improvement of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO, c 9-10, TN/DS/W/35 (Jan. 22, 2003). It
would also be possible for panels to set that level in original proceedings.
32. See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are
Rules- Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 335, 337-38, 345-46 (2000)
(discussing methods to induce compensation payments).
33. Under WTO rules, if a WTO member fails to bring an offending measure into
compliance with its WTO obligations within the reasonable period of time set for imple-
mentation, the prevailing WTO member may ask the WTO Dispute Settlement Body for
authority to suspend concessions that it owes to the offending member and such author-
ity is to be granted absent a consensus to the contrary. DSU art. 22.2. Such suspension
of concessions is typically referred to as retaliation and usually consists of raising tariffs
beyond bound limits, often to prohibitive levels, on certain products from the offending
member. The DSU limits the level of suspension of concessions to the level of nullifica-
tion or impairment caused by the offending measure. Id. art. 22.4. If there is a dispute
over that level, it is resolved by arbitration. Id. art, 22.6-22.7.
Cornell International Law Journal
trade reasons. 34 Retaliation was never formally used under GATT rules,
and retaliatory measures have been applied to date in only four cases
under WTO rules: European Community- Bananas,35 European Commu-
nity-Hormones,36 United States-Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC),37 and
United States Byrd Amendment 38.39 The Hormones retaliation has not
changed EU policy after almost nine years. 40 It is arguable that retaliation
in the other three cases, plus the possibility of retaliation under the safe-
guards agreement in the United States-Steel Safeguards case, 41 may have
had some effect on resolving those disputes, but it would be difficult to
establish that retaliation was the key factor in eventual implementation. 42
34. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed.
2007).
35. See Panel Report, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, passim,
WT/DS27/RW/USA (May 19, 2008) (discussing the Untied States' retaliation
measures).
36. See Appellate Body Report, United States- Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC-Hormones Dispute, T1 12-15, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter
US- Continued Suspension].
37. See generally Decision of the Arbitrator, United States- Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations", Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002).
38. See generally Decision of the Arbitrator, United States- Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6
of the DSU, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN (Aug. 31, 2004).
39. Retaliation was also authorized, but not imposed, in two of the cases arising out
of the Canada-Brazil dispute over export subsidies to regional jet makers. Arbitration
reports setting the permissible levels of retaliation were issued in the United States 1916
Act case and the United States- Gambling case, although the Dispute Settlement Body
has yet to be requested to authorize retaliation in those cases. JACKSON ET AL., supra note
2, at 365; see DSB Annual Report (2007), supra note 13, at 97, 99.
40. See US- Continued Suspension, supra note 36, '1 737 (noting that the Appellate
Body could not ascertain at this stage whether the European Communities had substan-
tially complied with Article 22.8 of the DSU).
41. Appellate Body Report, United States- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003).
42. In the Steel Safeguards case, the threat of significant and imminent retaliatory
action by the European Union seemed to play a major role in the prompt removal of the
United States steel safeguards that had been found to violate WTO rules. Rossella
Brevetti & Christopher S. Rugaber, Bush Ends Steel Safeguard Tariffs in Face of Threat by
EU to Retaliate, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2021 (Dec. 11, 2003). In the FSC case, some
congressional leaders and staffers cited actual and threatened European Union retalia-
tion to justify changing the contested measures, but the overall impact of the retaliatory
measures was not clear. Compare Kurt Ritterpusch & Gary G. Yerkey, Conferees Reach
Reconciliation Accord, Strip Some FSC Benefits to Offset Cost, 23 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
720 (May 11, 2006), with Alison Bennett, Export Tax Repeal Conference Major Priority
with Only Days Left for Senate, Frist Says, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1591 (Sept. 30,
2004) [hereinafter Export Tax Repeal], and Alison Bennett, Retaliatory EU Taxes Not Seen
Creating Expected Pressure to Pass Export Tax Bills, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1193 (July
15, 2004) [hereinafter Retaliatory EU Taxes]. In the Byrd Amendment case, the role of
actual and threatened retaliation was less clear. The EC and Canada imposed retaliatory
sanctions in May 2005, while Mexico and Japan did so in August and others threatened
to do so. Rossella Brevetti & Michael O'Boyle, EC, Canada Move to Impose Retaliatory
Duties in Byrd Dispute, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 546 (Apr. 7, 2005); Michael O'Boyle,
Mexico Slaps Punitive Duties on U.S. Goods Due to Noncompliance with WTO Byrd Ruling,
22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1386 (Aug. 25, 2005); Daniel Pruzin, Remaining Complainants
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The reality is that the overall good record of the system is due mainly to the
good faith desire of WTO members to see the dispute settlement system
work effectively. 4 3 The more active users of the system are repeat players,
and they appear as both complainants and respondents. 44 It is in their
overall interest that the system functions effectively. However, there will be
cases in which such good faith cannot be relied upon, compliance becomes
an issue, and retaliation may be helpful to promote compliance.
Initially, it is important to bear in mind that the ultimate WTO remedy
of retaliation is prospective. Prospective retaliation gives the losing coun-
try an incentive to delay the time of reckoning as long as possible and prob-
ably explains the extensive delays in the system as well as the frequent use
of Article 21.5 compliance proceedings. However effective retaliation may
be when used by a major player in the WTO, retaliation is probably not an
effective remedy for a small or developing country (even if that country can
target sensitive large country sectors such as copyright holders). It is cer-
tainly the case that developing and small countries have never utilized the
possibility of taking such measures, even following WTO authorization. 45
There are several practical changes in the WTO remedy provisions that
offer hope for improving implementation of WTO dispute settlement deci-
sions. Three changes in particular should be given serious consideration.
The WTO remedies for non-implementation should incorporate (i) the pos-
sibility of substituting fines or damages as a remedy in lieu of suspension
of concessions; (ii) some degree of retroactivity, so as to help encourage
compliance within the reasonable period of time;46 and (iii) some adjust-
ment mechanism to increase the level of sanctions over time, so as to pre-
Warn of Intent To Proceed With Byrd Sanctions by July, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 938
(June 9, 2005). Following a September GAO report showing that few firms benefited
from the Byrd Amendment, a House committee approved legislation repealing it, which
was finally approved in early 2006. Rossella Brevetti, Byrd Act Beset by Problems, GAO
Says; Five Firms Get 46 Percent of Distributions, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1557 (Sept.
29, 2005); Rossella Brevetti, House Approves Budget Measure Containing Byrd Amendment
Repeal, 23 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 184 (Feb. 2, 2006); Rossella Brevetti, House Ways and
Means Panel Approves Repeal of Byrd Law in Budget Measure, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1747 (Nov. 3, 2005). While the retaliatory measures certainly played a role, the limited
number of beneficiaries of the Byrd Amendment was also important. In the Bananas
case, the United States retaliatory measures served to increase the profile of the dispute,
but other factors such as the desire by new administrations in the United States and in
the European Union to improve their bilateral relations seemed at least as important in
its resolution. Joe Kirwn, Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. and EU End Decade-
Long Dispute over EU's Banana Import Regime, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 564 (Apr. 12,
2001).
43. See generally Appellate Body 2007 Annual Report, supra note 21, at 42-47
(describing the way that repeat players use this system).
44. Id.
45. The only arguable exception is Mexico in the Byrd Amendment case where the
European Union, Canada, and Japan acted first. O'Boyle, supra note 42, at 1386; see
How Have Developing Countries Fared?, supra note 30, at 37-38.
46. 1 have argued elsewhere that the typical reasonable periods of time for imple-
mentation set by the WTO system are too long and should be systematically shortened.
See Expediting the Panel Process, supra note 23, at 426-28.
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clude non-compliance from becoming an acceptable status quo position. I
will discuss each in turn.
First, I think it is evident that another remedy more meaningful to the
typical WTO member is needed, because only a small group of powerful
countries can be expected to effectively use retaliation. The obvious possi-
ble remedy is to allow a prevailing party to choose between suspension of
concessions and receipt of a periodic monetary payment. Two particular
problems would arise from implementing such a change. The first prob-
lem is that WTO members obviously vary in their abilities to pay fines.
The system would have to be designed to avoid the possibility that rich
members could effectively buy their way out of obligations in a way not
available to the poor members. That result might be accomplished by tying
the amount of fines to the size of the member's economy or otherwise pro-
viding for a sliding scale that would minimize "discrimination" against
poor members. The result could also be accomplished by giving the choice
between suspension of concessions and receipt of a periodic monetary
payment only to developing countries and small developed countries; how-
ever this "discrimination" against the larger, richer countries might make
the reform considerably less viable. Additionally, because this change
would resemble forced compensation, an enforceability problem arises
here as well. However, if the amount has been set by a DSU Article 26
arbitration, one could provide that the award would be enforceable under
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, thus largely eliminating the enforceability issue.47 Even if
this alternative is sometimes problematic, the right to receive a payment
will presumably work out in some circumstances and still be more valuable
than the never-used and probably unusable right to suspend concessions.
Second, the prospective nature of WTO remedies currently gives coun-
tries no incentive to comply promptly and may even encourage foot drag-
ging. To minimize this problem and to create incentives for prompt
compliance, any remedy (whether retaliation or money payment) should
be calculated from a date prior to the date set for implementation (e.g.,
date of adoption of the relevant report or date of panel establishment or
even earlier). Because the current rule would continue so that no remedy
would be imposed if implementation occurs within the reasonable period
of time, there would be an incentive to meet that deadline for
implementation.
Third, increasing sanctions over time would also seem to offer some
real possibilities for improving implementation. Such a procedure would
help to avoid the perception that the payment of fines or damages is simply
an alternative to compliance. In a sense, the European Community used
this concept in the FSC case when it imposed a duty on a long list of U.S.
47. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_l e.pdf. The vast majority of WTO mem-
bers are party to the convention. As a backup, non-parties could be required to create
funds from which fines or damages could be paid without specific legislative approval.
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products that started at 5% and was increased by 1% each month. 48 The
monthly change focused attention on the case each month, and the
impending increase, even if small, created an incentive to act to forestall
it.49 In U.S. congressional debates on the FSC implementation legislation,
some members of Congress made this point.50 The huge size of the FSC
sanctions-$4 billion-made a phase-in of the sanctions practical in any
event.51 However, the same concept could be used in other cases to
encourage more prompt implementation.
If the changes suggested above were made, how effective would they be
in addressing the problems of timeliness and quality of implementation?
The use of retrospective remedies and increased sanctions over time would
likely help solve the particular implementation problems in the subsidy,
agriculture, and SPS areas.5 2 In each case, the cost of non-compliance
would increase and that increase would help offset the political opposition
to implementation. However, that would not necessarily be the case for
safeguards and trade remedies. As outlined above, the assumption of the
current system (and the proposed changes thereto) is that compliance
within the set reasonable period of time would absolve a country from suf-
fering the application of any remedy. However, in the area of safeguards
and trade remedies such a rule would still allow a country to impose the
safeguard or remedy and enjoy its effect; the country would only be com-
pelled to remove the safeguard or remedy after the WTO dispute settlement
procedure had run its course. Thus, questionable safeguards and trade
remedies might continue to be imposed and then removed after a couple of
years of disrupting trade. While removal would be more timely with these
changes, significant trade disruption would continue to occur.
It seems to me that the only way to solve this problem would be to
require payment of reparations if the imposition of such measures is found
to be WTO-inconsistent. I think that other possible reforms are unlikely to
work. For example, WTO disputes are often too complex to expect that a
system of provisional remedies could make much difference. Because these
measures often stop trade-resulting in no collection of duties-a rule on
refund of duties would also not address the problem in general. Providing
for reparations for damages to trade flows might work. However, although
reparations are the standard remedy in international law for violations of a
state's obligations, 5 3 importing such a concept into the WTO would proba-
48. Ritterpusch & Yerkey, supra note 42, at 722.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 720; see also Export Tax Repeal, supra note 42, at 1591; Retaliatory EU
Taxes, supra note 42, at 1193.
51. See Ritterpusch & Yerkey, supra note 42, at 721.
52. See Isabelle Van Damme, Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview, 8 J. INT'L
EcON. L. 769, 779-80 (2005).
53. See JAMES CRAwFoRD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 201-06 (2002) (noting that Arti-
cle 31(1) of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility pro-
vides: "The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act").
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bly be viewed by WTO members as a more drastic and less acceptable
change than the adjustments to the current reforms proposed above.
In conclusion, the WTO dispute settlement system has an admirable
record, but one that is in need of reinforcement through thoughtful
improvements, especially with respect to remedies. In particular, as argued
above, the WTO remedies for non-implementation should incorporate: (i)
the possibility of substituting fines or damages as a remedy in lieu of sus-
pension of concessions; (ii) some degree of retroactivity, so as to help
encourage compliance within the reasonable period of time; and (iii) some
adjustment mechanism to increase the level of sanctions over time, to pre-
clude non-compliance from becoming an acceptable status quo position.
These changes would likely improve the WTO dispute settlement system's
implementation record.
